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The thesis that the practice and evaluation of science requires social value-
judgment, that good science is not value-free or value-neutral but value-laden,
has been gaining acceptance among philosophers of science. The main pro-
ponents of the value-ladenness of science rely on either arguments from the
underdetermination of theory by evidence or arguments from inductive risk.
Both arguments share the premise that we should only consider values once
the evidence runs out, or where it leaves uncertainty; they adopt a criterion
of lexical priority of evidence over values. The motivation behind lexical pri-
ority is to avoid reaching conclusions on the basis of wishful thinking rather
than good evidence. The problem of wishful thinking is indeed real—it would
be an egregious error to adopt beliefs about the world because they comport
with how one would prefer the world to be. I will argue, however, that giving
lexical priority to evidential considerations over values is a mistake, and unnec-
essary for adequately avoiding the problem of wishful thinking. Values have a
deeper role to play in science than proponents of the underdetermination and
inductive risk arguments have suggested.
1 Introduction
This paper is part of the larger project of trying to understand the structure of
values in science, i.e., the role of values in the logic of scientific practice. This is
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distinct from the project of strategic arguments that try to establish that science
is value-laden while assuming premises of the defenders of the value-free ideal of
science. It is becoming increasingly hard to deny that values play a role in scientific
practice—specifically non-epistemic, non-cognitive, or contextual values, e.g., moral,
political, and aesthetic values (I will use the term “social values” to refer to such
values in general). What is less clear is what parts of scientific practice require
values or value-judgments. This is not primarily a historical or sociological question,
though historical and sociological data is frequently brought to bear. Ultimately it is
a normative question about the role that value-judgments ought to play in science; it
is a question about the proper ideal of scientific practice. As such, we must consider
both ethical questions about how the responsible conduct of science requires value-
judgment and epistemological questions about how the objectivity and reliability of
science is to be preserved.
There are a number of phases of inquiry where values might play a role: (1) in
determing the value of science itself and (2) the research agenda to be pursued, (3) in
framing the problem under investigation and (4) the methods of data collection and
characterization, (5) in choosing the hypothesis, explanation, or solution to propose,
(6) in the testing or certification of a proposed solution, and (7) in choices about
application and dissemination of results. Various accounts have allowed values in
some stages while excluding it in others, or have argued for specific limits on the
role for values at each stage. In this paper, I will focus on the testing phase, where
theories are compared with evidence and certified (or not) as knowledge, as this is
the most central arena for discussion value-free vs. value-laden science. Traditionally,
philosophers of science have accepted a role for values in practice because it could be
marginalized into the “context of discovery,” while the “context of justification” could
be treated as epistemically pure. Once we turn from the logical context of justification
to the actual context of certification1 in practice, the testing of hypotheses within
concrete inquiries conducted by particular scientists, we can no longer ignore the role
of value-judgments.
There are two main arguments in the literature for this claim: the error argument
from inductive risk and the gap argument from the underdetermination of theory by
evidence. While both of these arguments have been historically very important and
have successfully established important roles for values in science, they share a flawed
1I use “context of certification” following Kitcher (2011), as referring to actual practices of accep-
tance. While I won’t emphasize it in this paper, I also follow Kitcher in thinking that certification
is a social practice that results in accepting a result as part of public knowledge (as opposed to
merely individual belief).
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premise, the lexical priority of evidence over values.2 While this premise serves an
important aim, that of avoiding the problem of wishful thinking, I will argue that
there are several problems with this premise. We should seek an alternative ideal for
science that provides a role for values at a more fundamental level and broader scope,
but nevertheless preserves an important feature of science: the ability to surprise us
with new information beyond or contrary to what we already hope or believe to be
true.
2 Underdetermination: The Gap Argument
Underdetermination arguments for the value-ladenness of science extend Duhem’s
and Quine’s thoughts about testing and certification. The starting point for this ar-
gument may be the so-called Duhem-Quine Thesis (or Duhem-Neurath-Quine Thesis
(Rutte, 1991, p. 87)) that no hypothesis can be tested in isolation because of the need
for auxiliary assumptions in order for theories to generate testable hypotheses. This
is generally taken to imply that no theory can be definitively falsified by evidence,
as the choice between rejecting the theory, altering the background assumptions,
or even (though more controversially) rejecting the new evidence itself as faulty is
underdetermined by each new item of evidence—call this “holist underdetermina-
tion”(Stanford, 2009).
Another form of underdetermination—“contrastive underdetermination” (ibid.)—
depends on the choice between identically confirmed rival hypotheses. As all of the
evidence available equally supports either hypothesis in such cases, that choice is
underdetermined by the evidence. If the evidence we’re talking about is just all the
evidence we have available to us at present, then we have transient underdetermina-
tion, which might be relatively temporary or might be a recurrent problem. If instead
the choice is underdetermined by all possible evidence, we have permanent under-
determination and the competing theories or hypotheses are empirically equivalent.
The global underdetermination thesis holds that permanent underdetermination is
ubiquitous in science, applying to all theories and hypotheses.3
The many forms of underdetermination argument have in common the idea that
some form of gap exists between theory and observation. Feminists, pragmatists,
2Strictly speaking, both arguments can be taken as strategic arguments, compatible with any
positive approach to the role of values in scientific inquiry. For the purposes of this paper, I will
instead take the arguments as attempts to articulate a positive ideal. The gap and error arguments
are perfectly serviceable as strategic arguments.
3For discussion of forms of underdetermination, see Kitcher (2001); Magnus (2003); Stanford
(2009); Intemann (2005); Biddle (2011).
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and others have sought to fill that gap with social values, or to argue that doing
so does not violate rational prescriptions on scientific inference. Call this the gap
argument for value-laden science (Intemann, 2005; Elliott, 2011). Kitcher (2001)
has argued that permanent or global underdetermination is needed to defeat the
value-free ideal of science, and these forms of underdetermination are much more
controversial. Transient underdetermination, on the other hand, is “familiar and
unthreatening,” even “mundane”(Kitcher, 2001, p. 30-1)
Kitcher is wrong on this point; transient underdetermination is sufficient to es-
tablish the value-ladenness of scientific practice (Biddle, 2011). What matters are
decisions made in practice by actual scientists, and at least in many areas of cutting
edge and policy-relevant science, transient underdetermination is pervasive. Perhaps
it is the case that in the long run of science (in an imagined Peircean “end of inquiry”)
all value-judgments would wash out. But as the cliche´ goes, in the long run we’re
all dead; for the purposes of this discussion, what we’re concerned with is decisions
made now, in the actual course of scientific practices, where the decision to accept or
reject a hypothesis has pressing consequences. In such cases, we cannot wait for the
end of inquiry for scientists to accept or reject a hypothesis, we cannot depend on
anyone else to do it, and we must contend with uncertainty and underdetermination.
Actual scientific practice supports this—scientists find themselves in the business of
accepting and rejecting hypotheses in such conditions.
So what is the role for social values under conditions of transient underdetermi-
nation? Once the existing evidence is in, a gap remains in definitively determining
how it bears on the hypothesis (holist case) or which competing hypothesis to ac-
cept (contrastive case). In this case, it can be legitimate to fill the gap with social
values. For example, among the competing hypotheses still compatible with all the
evidence, one might accept the one whose acceptance is likely to do the most good
or the least harm. E.g., in social science work involving gender or race, this might
be the hypothesis compatible with egalitarianism.
A common response is that despite the existence of the gap, we should ensure
that no social values enter into decisions about how to make the underdetermined
choice (e.g., whether or not to accept a hypothesis). Instead, we might fill the gap
with more complex inferential criteria (Norton, 2008) or with so-called “epistemic”
or “cognitive” values (Kuhn, 1977; Laudan, 1984). Proponents of the gap argu-
ment have argued that this at best pushes the question back one level, as choices
of epistemic criteria or cognitive values (Longino, 2002, p. 185), and application of
cognitive values itself may not be entirely determinate (Kuhn, 1977). Ensuring that
no values actually enter into decisions to accept or reject hypotheses under condi-
tions of transient underdetermination may turn out to be impossible (Biddle, 2011).
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Another attempt to avoid a role for social value-judgments—withholding judgment
until transient underdetermination can be overcome or resolved by application of
cognitive factors along—is unreasonable or irresponsible in many cases, e.g. where
urgent action requires commitment to one or another option (ibid.).4
What distinguishes legitimate from illegitimate uses of values to fill the gap is a
matter of controversy, sometimes left unspecified. With some exceptions,5 underde-
terminationists insist that values only come into play in filling the gap (e.g., Longino,
1990, p. 52, 2002, p. 127; Kourany, 2003).
3 Inductive Risk: The Error Argument
While underdeterminationist arguments for values in science are probably more well
known, and may have a history going back a paper of Neurath’s from 1913 (Howard,
2006), the inductive risk argument for values in science is older still, going back to
William James’ (1896) article “The Will to Believe.”6 Heather Douglas has revived
Rudner’s (1953) and Hempel’s (1965) version of the argument for the value-ladenness
of science. In simplified form, the argument goes like this:
In accepting or rejecting hypotheses, scientists can never have complete certainty
that they are making the right choice—uncertainty is endemic to ampliative infer-
ence. So, inquirers must decide whether there is enough evidence to accept or reject
the hypothesis. What counts as enough should be determined by how important the
question is, i.e., the seriousness of making a mistake. That importance or seriousness
is generally (in part) an ethical question, dependent on the ethical evaluation of the
consequences of error. Call this argument for the use of value-judgments in science
from the existence of inductive risk the error argument (Elliott, 2011).
According to the error argument, the main role for values in certification of sci-
entific hypotheses has to do with how much uncertainty to accept, or how strict to
make your standards for acceptance. In statistical contexts, we can think of this as
the trade-off between type I and type II error. Once we have a fixed sample size (and
assuming we have no control over the effect size), the only way we can decrease the
probability that we wrongly reject the null hypothesis is to increase the probability
4Proponents of the inductive risk argument make a similar point.
5These exceptions either use a somewhat different sort of appeal to underdetermination than the
gap argument, or they use the gap argument as a strategic argument. One example is the extension
of the Quinean web of belief to include value-judgments (Nelson, 1990), discussed in more detail
below.
6This connection is due to P.D. Magnus (2012), who refers to the inductive risk argument as the
“James-Rudner-Douglas or JRD thesis” for reasons that will become immediately apparent.
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that we wrongly accept the null hypothesis (or, perhaps more carefully, that we fail
to reject the null hypothesis when it is in fact false), and vice versa. Suppose we are
looking for a causal link between a certain chemical compound and liver cancers in
rats,7 and you take H0 to be no link whatsoever. If you want to be absolutely sure
that you don’t say that the chemical is safe when it in fact is not (because you value
safety, precaution, welfare of potential third parties), you should decrease your rate
of type II errors, and thus increase your statistical significance factor and your rate
of type I errors. If you want to avoid “crying wolf” and asserting a link where none
exists (because you value economic benefits that come with avoiding overregulation),
you should do the reverse.
Douglas emphasizes at length that values (neither social nor cognitive values)
should not be taken as reasons for accepting or rejecting a hypothesis, reasons on a
par with or having the same sort of role as evidence in testing.8 This is an impermis-
sible direct role for values. In their permissible indirect role, values help determine
the rules of scientific method, e.g., decisions about how many false positives or false
negatives to accept. Values are not reasons guiding belief or acceptance; they instead
guide decisions about how to manage uncertainty.9
Rudner (1953) anticipated the objection that scientists should not be in the busi-
ness of accepting or rejecting hypothesis, but rather just indicating their probability
(and thus not having to make the decision described above). This response wrongly
assumes that inductive risk only occurs at the final step of certification; in reality,
this gambit only pushes the inductive risk back a step to the determination of prob-
abilities. Furthermore, the pragmatic signal that accompanies a refusal to assent
or deny a claim in practical or policy circumstances may be that the claim is far
more questionable that the probabilities support. Simply ignoring the consequences
of error—by refusing to accept or reject, by relying only on cognitive values, or by
choosing purely conventional levels for error—may be irresponsible, as scientists like
anyone else have the moral responsibility to consider the foreseeable consequences of
their action.
7Douglas (2000) considers the actual research on this link with dioxin.
8Strictly speaking, this is an extension of the error argument, and not all who accept the argu-
ment (especially for strategic purposes) need accept this addition.
9In Toulmin’s (1958) terms, values cannot work as grounds for claims, but they can work as
backing for warrants.
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4 A Shared Premise
These two arguments against the value-free ideal of science share a common premise.
The gap argument holds that values can play a role in the space fixed by the ev-
idence; if the gap narrows (as it would with transient underdetermination), there
are fewer ways in which values can play a role, and if the gap could ever be close,
the conclusion would be value-free. (An exception are those views that add values
into the radically holistic interpretation of Quine’s web of belief, such that values,
theories, and evidence are all equally revisable in the light of new evidence.) The
inductive risk argument allows values to play a role in decisions about how to man-
age uncertainty—not directly by telling us which option to pick, but indirectly in
determining how much uncertainty is acceptable.
Both arguments begin from a situation where the evidence is fixed and take
values to play a role in the space that is left over. The reason that values must
play a role is that uncertainty remains once the evidence is in. In a relatively weak
version of this argument, social values fill in the space between evidence and theory
because something has to, so it might as well be (and often is) social values. In more
sophisticated versions, we must use social values to fill the gap because of our general
moral obligation to consider the foreseeable consequences of our actions, including
the action of accepting a hypothesis. The arguments of these two general forms all
assume the lexical priority of evidence over values. The premise of lexical priority
guarantees that even in value-laden science, values do not compete with evidence
when the two conflict. This is often defended as an important guarantor of the
objectivity or reliability of the science in question.
5 Why Priority?
Why do proponents of value-laden science tend to be attracted to such a strict
priority of evidence over values? Perhaps some such restriction is required in order
to guarantee the objectivity of science. In order for our science to be as objective as
possible, maybe it has to be as value-free as possible (though this may not be very
value-free at all). That is, we want as much as possible to base our science on the
evidence because evidence lends objectivity and values detract from it. Even if this
view of objectivity were right, however, it would be a problematic justification for
opponents of the value-free ideal of science to adopt. With arguments like the gap
and inductive risk arguments, they mean to argue that values and objectivity are not
in conflict as such. It would thus create a serious tension in their view if one premise
depended on such a conflict. If it is really objectivity that is at stake in adopting
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lexical priority, we need a more nuanced approach.
I think the central concern concern is that value judgments might “drive inquiry
to a predetermined conclusion”(Anderson, 2004, p. 11), that inquirers might rig the
game in favor of their preferred values. As Douglas (2009) puts it, “Values are not
evidence; wishing does not make it so”(p. 87). In other words, a core value of science
is its ability to surprise us, to force us to revise our thinking. Call the threat of
values interfering with this process the problem of wishful thinking.
Lexical priority avoids this problem insofar as what we value (which involves
the way we desire the world to be) is only a consideration after we take all of the
evidence (which fixes the way the world is) into account. In Douglas’s more nuanced
approach, even once the evidence is in, social values (and even most cognitive values)
are not allowed to be taken directly as reasons to believe anything; they only act as
reasons for accepting a certain amount of evidence as “enough.”
An alternative explanation may be that the adoption of lexical priority has rhetor-
ical value.10 Suppose, along with the defenders of the value-free ideal, that there is
such a thing as objective evidence which constrains belief. Even so, there is (at least
transient) underdetermination, and a gap that must bridged by social values. Thus
not only is the value-free ideal impossible to realize, it may lead to unreasonable and
irresponsible avoidance of the role for values in filling the gap. Such an argument
can undermine the value-free ideal and establish that there is a major role for values
in science, and in the context of these goals, I freely admit that this can be a worth-
while strategy. But as we turn instead to the positive project of determining more
precisely the role(s) of values in the logic of scientific practice, the premises of such
an immanent critique are unfit ground for further development. We no longer need
to take the premises of our opponents on board, and we may find that they lead us
astray.
While following the basic contours of my argument so far, one might object to
characterizing of evidence as “prior” to values.11 What the gap and inductive risk
arguments purport to show is that there is always some uncertainty in scientific
inference (perhaps, for even more basic reasons, in all ampliative inference), and
so there will always be value-judgments to be made about when we have enough
evidence, or which among equally supported hypotheses we wish to accept, etc. The
pervasive need for such judgments means that value-freedom does not even make
sense as a limiting case; both values and evidence play a role, and neither is prior to
the other. This mistakes the sense of “priority” at work, however. Where priority
matters is what happens when values and evidence conflict; in such circumstances,
10Note redacted for purposes of anonymous review.
11Note redacted for purposes of anonymous review.
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lexical priority means that evidence will always trump values. In Douglas’s stronger
version of lexical priority, values allow you to determined what level of evidence you
need to accept a hypothesis (p = 0.05 or p = 0.01 or. . . ), but they cannot give you
a reason to reject the hypothesis,12 no matter what.
6 Problems with Priority
The versions of the gap and inductive risk arguments that presuppose the lexical
priority of evidence make two related mistakes. First, they require a relatively un-
critical stance towards the status of evidence within the context of certification.13
The lexical priority principle assumes that in testing, we ask: given the evidence,
what should we make of our hypothesis? Frame this way, values only play a role at
the margins of the process.
This is a mistake, since evidence can turn out to be bad in all sorts of ways: un-
reliable, unrepresentative, noisy, laden with unsuitable concepts and interpretations,
or irrelevant for the question at hand; the experimental apparatus could even have
a cord loose. More importantly, we may be totally unaware of why the evidence is
bad; after all, it took a great deal of ingenuity on the part of Galileo to show why
the tower experiment didn’t refute Copernicus, and it took much longer to deal with
the problem of the “missing” stellar parallax. While some epistemologists stick to an
abstract conception of evidence according to which evidence is itself unquestionable,
reflection on cases like this has lead many philosophers of science to recognize that
we can be skeptical about particular pieces or sets of evidence based on its clash with
hypotheses, theories, or background assumptions that we have other good reasons
to hold on to. As critics of strict falsificationism and empiricism have shown, we
already have reason to adopt a more egalitarian account of the process of testing and
certification, independent of the question about the role of values. We might get off
to a better start if we thought about how to fit values into this sort of picture of
testing.
12It seems possible that we could use our extreme aversion to some hypothesis to raise the required
level of certainty so high as to be at least practically unsatisfiable by human inquirers, and so in
effect rule out the hypothesis on the basis of values alone while remaining in the indirect role. While
it isn’t clear how to do it, it seems to be that Douglas means to rule this sort of case out as well.
13As Douglas (2009) makes clear, she does not take the status of evidence as unproblematic as
such. But any issues with the evidence are to be taken into account by prior consideration of values
in selection of methods and characterization of data. It would seem that value judgments in the
context of certification cannot be a reason to challenge the evidence itself. The following points are
intended to show that this restriction is unreasonable.
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Second, the attitude about values that lexical priority takes reduces the idea of
value judgment to merely expression of preferences rather than judgment properly so
called—in effect, they deny that we can have good reasons for our value judgments. It
is crucial to distinguish between values or valuing and value judgments or evaluations
(Dewey, 1915, 1939; Welchman, 2002; Anderson, 2010). Valuing may be the mere
expression of a preference, but value judgments are reflective decisions about values,
and properly speaking must be made on the basis of reasons (and judgments can
be better or worse because they are made on the basis of good and bad reasons).
Value judgments may even be open to a certain sort of empirical test, because they
hypothesize relationships between a state or course of action to prefer and pursue
and the desirability or value of the consequences of pursuing and attaining them
(Dewey, 1915; Anderson, 2010). Value judgments say something like “try it, you’ll
like it”—a testable hypothesis (Anderson, 2010). The evidence by which we test
value judgments may include the emotional experiences that follow on adopting those
values (Anderson, 2004).
If value judgments are judgments properly so called, adopted for good reasons,
subject to certain sorts of tests, then it is unreasonable to treat them in the manner
required by the lexical priority of evidence. Just as the good (partly empirical)
reasons for adopting a theory, hypothesis, or background assumption can give us
good reasons to reinterpret, reject, or maybe even ignore evidence apparently in
conflict with them (under certain conditions), so too with a good value judgment.
If evidence and values pull in opposite directions on the acceptance of a hypothesis,
then we should not always be forced to follow the (putative) evidence.
7 Avoiding Wishful Thinking without Priority
If we reject the lexical priority assumption and adopt a more egalitarian model of
testing, we need to adopt an alternative approach that can avoid the problem of
wishful thinking.
(An alternative principle to lexical priority is the joint necessity of evidence and
values, which requires joint satisfaction of epistemic criteria and social values. This
is the approach taken by Kourany (2010). On such a view, neither evidence nor
values takes priority, but this principle leaves open the question of what to do when
evidence and values clash. One option is to remain dogmatic about both epistemic
criteria and social values, and to regard any solution which flouts either as a failure,
which appears to be Kourany’s response.
Alternatively, we can adopt the rational revisability of evidence and values
in addition to joint necessity and revisit and refine our evidence or values. On this
10
principle, both the production of evidence and value formation are recognized as
rational but fallible processes, open to revision. Such a view might include the radical
version of Quinean holism which inserts values into the web of belief. The adoption
of these two principles alone does not prevent wishful thinking, but adding some
basic principles like minimal mutilation may overcome the problem. (cf. Kitcher,
2011)
Instead of Quinean holism, we might instead adopt a form of pragmatist func-
tionalism about inquiry (Brown, 2012) which differentiates the functional roles of
evidence, theory, and values in inquiry. This retains the idea that all three have to
be coordinated and that each is revisable in the face of new experience, while intro-
ducing further structure into their interactions and According to such an account,
not only must evidence, theory, and values fit together fit together in their functional
roles, they must do so in a way that actually resolves the problem that spurred the
inquiry.
8 Conclusion
The lexical priority of evidence over values is an undesirable commitment, and un-
necessary for solving the problem it was intended to solve. The key to the problem
of wishful thinking is that we not predetermine the conclusion of inquiry, that we
leave ourself open to surprise. The real problem is not the insertion of values, but
dogmatism about values (Anderson 2004). Rather than being the best way to avoid
dogmatism, the lexical priority of evidence over values coheres best with a dogmatic
picture of value judgments, and so encourages the illegitimate use of values. A better
account is one where values and evidence are treated as mutually necessary, func-
tionally differentiated, and rationally revisable components of certification. Such an
account would allow that evidence may be rejected because of lack of fit with a
favored hypothesis and compelling value-judgments, but only so long as one is still
able to effectively solve the problem of inquiry.
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